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Abstract
Rational expectations has been the dominant way to model expectations, but the literature
has quickly moved to a more realistic assumption of boundedly rational learning where agents
are assumed to use only a limited set of information to form their expectations. A standard
assumption is that agents form expectations by using the correctly speci￿ed reduced form model
of the economy, the minimal state variable solution (MSV), but they do not know the parameters.
However, with medium-sized and large models the closed-form MSV solutions are di¢ cult to attain
given the large number of variables that could be included. Therefore, agents base expectations
on a misspeci￿ed MSV solution. In contrast, we assume agents know the deep parameters of
their own optimising frameworks. However, they are not assumed to know the structure nor the
parameterisation of the rest of the economy, nor do they know the stochastic processes generating
shocks hitting the economy. In addition, agents are assumed to know that the changes (or the
growth rates) of fundament variables can be modelled as stationary ARMA(p,q) processes, the
exact form of which is not, however, known by agents. This approach avoids the complexities of
dealing with a potential vast multitude of alternative mis-speci￿ed MSVs.
Using a new Multi-country Euro area Model with Boundedly Estimated Rationality we show
this approach is compatible with the same limited information assumption that was used in
deriving and estimating the behavioral equations of di⁄erent optimizing agents. We ￿nd that
there are strong di⁄erences in the adjustment path to the shocks to the economy when agent form
expectations using our learning approach compared to expectations formed under the assumption
of strong rationality. Furthermore, we ￿nd that some variation in expansionary ￿scal policy in
periods of downturns compared to boom periods.5
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1316
April 2011
Non technical summary
The dominant way to model expectations has been via model-consistent rational expectations (strong
rationality). Whilst rational expectations (RE) can be taken as a theoretically well founded polar case,
resorting to only them is not unproblematic. Therefore, given the extreme nature of the assumptions
underlying rational expectations the literature has moved to a more realistic assumption of boundedly
rational learning where agents are assumed to use only a limited set of information to form their
expectations and do not know the complete structure of the model. The learning literature has
pointed out that often a particular learning speci￿cation will produce a unique solution. However it
is important to note that if the speci￿c form of the learning process produces di⁄erent solutions then
the choice between these solutions and implicitly the corresponding Rational expectation equilibria
(REE) is being made on the basis of a largely arbitrary decision. This motivates much of the argument
presented in this paper that the choice of the form of the learning rule itself can be crucially important.
In the adaptive learning literature a standard assumption is that agents form expectations by
using the correct model of the economy, but do not know the parameters i.e. agents have perfect
knowledge about the structure of the economy and hence know the correct speci￿cation of the REE
minimal state variable solution (MSV). However, in contrast to the RE solution, they have imperfect
knowledge about the true values of the structural parameters and the implied parameter values of
the true MSV solution. An alternative strand in the recent learning literature has been that, instead
of using a correctly speci￿ed MSV, agents base their projections on a mis-speci￿ed MSV solution.
This approach in e⁄ect drops the assumption of common information set of rational agents that fully
understand the world, and therefore is more in line with the literature of heterogeneous agents with
incomplete knowledge and expectations. Although agents fail to recognize the full set of correlations,
agents are still rational in the sense that they avoid systematic mistakes by being willing to learn from
past mistakes and change their behaviour.
Our approach deviates from all the aforementioned approaches. The basic principle of our approach
is that it is compatible with the same limited information assumption that was used in deriving
and estimating the behavioral equations of di⁄erent optimizing agents. Hence, agents know the
deep parameters of their own optimising frameworks, however, they are not assumed to know the
structure nor the parameterisation of the rest of the economy. Neither do they know the stochastic
processes generating shocks hitting the economy. Therefore, instead of using the correctly speci￿ed full
model MSV, agents are assumed to use single equation MSV where the fundament variable, although
endogenous in the whole model, is treated as predetermined for the optimising agent. Our approach
is theoretically consistent as agents￿local optimising decisions and future expectations are based on
the same information set. It also avoids the complexities of dealing with a potential vast multitude
of alternative misspeci￿ed MSVs.
In this paper we formalise this approach and apply it to a New Multi-Country Model (NMCM)
see Dieppe et al (2011). The model can be characterised as an optimising agent - new keynesian
model, but in contrast to standard DSGE models, we assume limited-information and it is more of
a bottom-up approach as opposed to the standard DSGE top down approach where agents have full
knowledge. In line with these limitations in the information base, all forward looking equations of
the NMCM are estimated by the single equation instrumental variable method of GMM that requires
rationality only under limited information.
In this paper we argue more formally that a single equation approach is more in line with the
kind of bounded rationality assumed in the NMCM in de￿ning the relevant information base for
learning expectations than the approach based on the correctly speci￿ed reduced form of the whole
model. Once we have presented the framework for the model and the implied estimation of the
learning expectation equations, we study how the properties of the model di⁄er from those obtained
assuming perfect foresight (or model consistent) rational expectations. We further illustrate the
implications by studying the impact of a ￿scal policy expansion under learning expectations and6
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under rational expectations, when the policy change is credibly announced or alternatively its exact
nature is unannounced (or uncredibly announced). We ￿nd that there are strong di⁄erences in the
adjustment path to the shocks to the economy when agent form expectations using our learning
approach compared to expectations formed under the assumption of strong rationality. Furthermore
we show how, under our framework, the behaviour of the economy varies depending on the state of
the economy and agents perceptions of the future.
Overall, we have aimed to outline a coherent and realistic framework for learning in limited infor-
mation medium-scale models.
1 Introduction
The dominant way to model expectations has been via model-consistent rational expectations (strong
rationality). Whilst rational expectations (RE) can be taken as a theoretically well founded polar
case, resorting to only them is not unproblematic. It is well known that rational expectations can give
rise to a multiplicity of solutions, sometimes terminal or transversality conditions may be enough to
produce a unique solution but these conditions are always somewhat arbitrary. Rational expectations
has also been criticised as it assumes too much information on the part of agents. Furthermore, it is
well known that there have been di¢ culties in using large models that incorporate RE for forecasting,
although there has recently been signi￿cant advances in using DSGE models for forecasting at policy-
making institutions (e.g., Riksbank, Norges Bank, Bank of Finland, Czech National Bank and the
ECB).
While rational expectation has been the dominant way to model expectation over the last forty
years the literature on learning goes back almost as far as the rational expectations literature. Early
work on learning includes Friedman (1975), Townsend (1978, 1983), Frydman (1982), Bray (1983)
and Bray and Kreps (1984). This work focused almost exclusively on the stability properties of
very small models, usually only one market. These models investigated a situation often referred
to as ￿ rational learning￿as it is assumed that agents know the true structure of the model being
investigated but simply have to learn the parameter values. Given the extreme nature of the rational
learning assumption the literature quickly moved to a more realist assumption of boundedly rational
learning where agents are assumed to use only a limited set of information to form their expectations
and do not know the complete structure of the model. Some early example from this literature include
DeCanio (1979), Radner (1982) and Bray and Savin (1986), these examples focused on a case where
the learning rule was the full reduced form of the model. Later papers began to use a learning rule
which contained only a subset of the full set of reduced form variables and to de￿ne the idea of E-
stability, when the parameters of the learning process converge to a ￿xed point (Evans 1989, Evans
and Honkapohja 1994, 1995, 2001). Marcet and Sargent (1988, 1989) make the important link between
E-stability and a conventional rational expectation equilibria (REE): when E-stability is attained the
model has also reached a REE.
The learning literature (Evans 1986, Woodford 1990) has pointed out that often a particular
learning speci￿cation will produce a unique solution and of course given the association of an E-
equilibria with a REE, this implies that a particular REE is being chosen without recourse to these
arbitrary transversality conditions. This illustrates that learning can bring positive advantages from an
analytical standpoint. However it is important to note that if the speci￿c form of the learning process
produces di⁄erent solutions then the choice between these solutions (and implicitly the corresponding
REE) is still being made on the basis of a largely arbitrary decision. This motivates much of the
argument presented in this paper that the choice of the form of the learning rule itself can be crucially
important.
In the adaptive learning literature a standard assumption is that agents form expectations by using
the correct model of the economy, but do not know the parameters (Evans and Honkapohja 2001),ECB
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i.e. agents have perfect knowledge about the structure of the economy and hence know the correct
speci￿cation of the REE minimal state variable solution (MSV), see McCallum (1983). However, in
contrast to the RE solution, they have imperfect knowledge about the true values of the structural
parameters and the implied parameter values of the true MSV solution. Hence, although correctly
speci￿ed, the perceived law of motion (PLM) that agents use in updating their expectations deviates
from the true MSV solution. Instead, the adaptive learning literature assumes that agents act like
econometricians by continuously re-estimating and updating the parameters of the PLM taking into
account observed expectation errors and all new information. Under these assumptions the actual law
of motion (ALM) gradually converges to the model consistent RE solution. However, as discussed e.g.
by Slobodyan and Wouters (2009), the short- and medium-run dynamics of the model may crucially
depend on how much the initial estimates of the parameters deviate from those of the RE solution
and, hence, may introduce non-voluntary arbitrariness into the dynamics of the estimated model.
Much of the learning literature has focussed on small, linear models where typically there is only
one homogeneous / representative agent with a common information set, Milani (2007, 2009, 2010)
and, hence, the correctly speci￿ed MSV solution for the whole model can be easily derived. With large
and medium-sized models closed-form MSV solutions are di¢ cult to attain given the large number
of variables that could be included. Indeed, for non-linear models closed-form MSV solutions do not
necessarily exist. Therefore, an alternative strand in the recent learning literature has been that,
instead of basing their PLM on the correctly speci￿ed MSV, agents base it on a misspeci￿ed MSV
solution. This approach in e⁄ect drops the assumption of common information set of rational agents
that fully understand the world, and therefore is more in line with the literature of heterogeneous
agents with incomplete knowledge and expectations. Although agents fail to recognize the full set of
correlations, agents are still rational in the sense that they avoid systematic mistakes by being willing
to learn from past mistakes and change their behaviour. Small model examples include Evans and
Honkapohja (2003), Dennis and Ravenna (2008). The larger the model the larger the set of options
among which to select a PLM. For example including only a subset of variables or including additional
variables compared to the correctly speci￿ed MSV solution, then the selected PLM speci￿cation could
be either under or over-parameterized. A key question then becomes of how to select from the various
PLM when an obvious choice is not available. There has been a number of approaches to this,
including choosing the explanatory variables that minimise the standard error of the regression, or
ranking correlations according to their standard deviations, or identifying principle components and
selecting the variables that mostly closely move with them (Beeby, Hall and Henry 2001). More
recently De Grauwe (2010) used a model in which agents use simple rules (heuristics) to forecast the
future, but these rules are then subjected to selection mechanism, so agents endogenously select the
forecasting rules that have delivered the greatest ￿tness in the past. Finally, an alternative approach
is to do Bayesian averaging over a variety of PLM.
Our approach deviates from all the aforementioned approaches. The basic principle of our approach
is that it is compatible with the same limited information assumption that was used in deriving and
estimating the behavioral equations of di⁄erent optimizing agents. Hence, agents know the deep
parameters of their own optimising frameworks, however, they are not assumed to know the structure
nor the parameterisation of the rest of the economy. Neither do they know the stochastic processes
generating shocks hitting the economy. Therefore, instead of basing their PLM on the correctly
speci￿ed full model MSV, agents are assumed to base it on the single equation MSV where the
fundament variable, although endogenous in the whole model, is treated as predetermined for the
optimising agent. In addition, in line with the fact that most economic time series are I(1) variables,
agents are assumed to know that the changes (or the growth rates) of fundament variables can be
modelled as stationary ARMA(p,q) processes, the exact form of which is not, however, assumed
to be known by agents. This suggests some form of heterogeneity of expectations, which could be
due to cognitive limitations faced by agents in understanding the world, or that the observability ofECB
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economic variables can be di⁄erent across agents or that the costs of having full information are too
large. This is also compatible with survey evidence showing clearly that expectations of aggregate
economic variables di⁄er across di⁄erent sectors/agents, e.g. consumers and ￿rms.
This approach implies that we avoid the conceptual di¢ culties encountered by DSGE models
with adaptive learning based on the misspeci￿ed MSV, i.e. whilst the underlying speci￿cation and
estimation of the typical DSGE model is e⁄ectively based on the optimisation of a single representative
agent or a central planer who knows the structure of the whole model, the information set regarding
the formation of learning is much more limited. Our approach, instead, is theoretically consistent
as agents￿local optimising decisions and future expectations are based on the same information set.
It also avoids the complexities of dealing with a potential vast multitude of alternative misspeci￿ed
PLMs.
In this paper we formalise this approach and apply it to a New Multi-Country Model (NMCM) see
Dieppe et al (2011). The model can be characterised as a optimising agent - new keynesian model, but
in contrast to standard DSGE models, we assume limited-information and, as in De Grauwe (2010),
it is more of a bottom-up approach as opposed to the standard DSGE top down approach where
agents have full knowledge. In line with these limitations in the information base, all forward looking
equations of the NMCM are estimated by the single equation instrumental variable method of GMM
that requires rationality only under limited information.
In the following section we argue more formally that a single equation approach is more in line
with the kind of bounded rationality assumed in the NMCM in de￿ning the relevant information
base for learning expectations than the approach based on the correctly speci￿ed reduced form of
the whole model. Once we have presented the framework for the model and the implied estimation
of the learning expectation equations, we study how the properties of the model di⁄er from those
obtained assuming perfect foresight (or model consistent) rational expectations. We further illustrate
the implications by studying the impact of a ￿scal policy expansion under learning expectations and
under rational expectations, when the policy change is credibly announced or alternatively its exact
nature is unannounced (or uncredibly announced). We ￿nd that the departure of learning expectations
solution from the rational expectations solution has a strong impact on the short-run properties of the
model while in the longer run solution paths converge. Finally, we consider how the model properties
change depending on the state of the economy.
As in Dieppe et al (2011), the model covers the 5 biggest euro area countries (Germany, France,
Italy, Spain and the Netherlands), can be used either on a single country basis or as a linked euro area
multi-country model, and it has been developed as macro model with both economic coherence, that
matches the key characteristics of the data and is useful to analyse policy issues as well as being the
main country macroeconomic tool used at the ECB in the context of the Eurosystem Macroeconomic
Projection exercises (see ECB 2001).
2 Learning setup
In this section we formalise the limited information expectations formation approach. We start by
a brief description of the adaptive learning framework under the assumption that all agents of the
economy fully know the structure of the economy that is the standard case in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) and adopted e.g. by Milani (2007 and 2010) and Slobodyan and Wouters (2009) in empirical
applications. Thereafter, we loosen this extreme information assumption to account for boundedly
rational learning under imperfect information on the exogenous driving processes.
2.1 Updating beliefs under full information on model structure
Assume a stochastic linear or linearized structural model,ECB
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A0xt￿1 + A1xt + A2Etyt+1 + ￿t = 0 (1)
where xt = [y0
t;z0
t]
0 is the vector of all model variables and ￿t = [v0
t;e0
t]
0 is the vector of white noise
disturbances. Both of them are (n + m)￿1 vectors. The vector yt contains the n endogenous variables
of the model and the vector zt the other m variables driven by exogenous processes e.g.,
zt = ￿zt￿1 + et (2)
where ￿ is a m ￿ m diagonal matrix of coe¢ cients. Now the REE minimal state variable (MSV)
solution of the model (1) with the driving processes (2) is of the form (McCallum 1983),
yt = a + byt￿1 + czt + vt (3)
implying that the expected values of the endogenous variables are,
Etyt+1 = a + byt + ￿czt (4)
It is clear that in order to be able to apply (3), when forming their expectations about future
outcomes, all agents must know exactly the structural model and its parameters, i.e. the model (1),
as well as the stochastic structure that in our simple example is determined by (2). Endowing the real
world agents with so much knowledge can hardly be considered realistic. More realistic would be to
assume that the agents form their expectations under imperfect knowledge. For instance, the standard
adaptive learning approach, as applied in Evans and Honkapohja (2001), assumes that agents know
exactly the exogenous driving processes and the correct speci￿cation of the MSV solution but not its
parameter values. Hence, they estimate the parameters (￿t;￿t;￿t) of the MSV speci￿cation using the
data available up to the point in time t and get the following Perceived Law of Motion (PLM),
yt = ￿t + ￿tyt￿1 + ￿tzt + ￿vt (5)
Whenever new data becomes available (5) will be re-estimated and its parameters updated using, for
instance, constant gain (perpetual learning) recursive least squares or Kalman ￿lter algorithms. This
procedure implies the following forecasting equation,
Etyt+1 = ￿t + ￿tyt + ￿￿tzt (6)
and the Actual Law of Motion (ALM) is obtained after inserting (6) into (1).
As shown by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) the parameters of (6) converge to those of (4). Hence,
the adaptive learning equilibrium converges to the REE. Now an interesting and, from the monetary
policy point of view, a very important question is how much the replacement of rational expectations
with adaptive learning expectations changes the adjustment dynamics of the model. This issue was
studied in a medium size DSGE model by Slobodyan and Wouters (2009). Their ￿nding was that
learning expectations did not change the dynamics of the model much from that implied by fully
rational expectations, at least, if the initial parameter values of (6) did not deviate too much from the
true REE values of (4). This is intuitively easy to understand, because initial parameter values of (6)
close to the true values of (4) imply that there does not exist much to learn and ALM utilizing (6)
cannot deviate much from that utilizing (4). Hence, to obtain more marked di⁄erences between the
adjustment dynamics based on rational expectations and adaptive learning expectations requires more
constrained information base than what is the case, when the speci￿cation of the PLM corresponds to
that of the correctly speci￿ed MSV solution. Constraining the information base is by itself no problem,
because learning based on the misspeci￿ed MSV quite generally converges to an equilibrium, although
not necessarily to REE, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001). The problem is rather how to constrain the
information base in an intelligent and unambiguous way among innumerably possible ways to do it.
In the following we show that in the NMCM framework, where the equations of the model are derived
and estimated under bounded rationality, there is an unambiguous and theoretically well-founded way
to de￿ne the information base for learning expectations.ECB
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2.2 Updating beliefs under limited information on model structure
In the NMCM the central DSGE assumption that all optimizing agents know fully the whole structure
of the model including stochastic processes generating exogenous shocks is replaced by bounded ratio-
nality. Each agent knows only the parameters related to her optimization problem but need not know
the rest of the model nor the stochastic exogenous processes driving the model. As the structure of the
whole model is largely unknown to the agents, they quite often do not know how shocks that hit the
economy are transmitted to the expected developments of the variables which are key determinants
of their optimized choices. This is the case although shocks may quite often be easily observable. In
line with these limitations in the information base all forward looking equations of the NMCM are
estimated by the single equation instrumental variable method of GMM that requires rationality only
under limited information. Hence, under these assumptions it is clear that the information content
of the correctly speci￿ed MSV solution is much larger than what was required for the agents, when
the equations of the NMCM were derived and estimated. In the following we argue that a single
equation approach is much more in line with the kind of bounded rationality assumed in the NMCM
in de￿ning the relevant information base for learning expectations than the approach based on the
correctly speci￿ed reduced form of the whole model.
Corresponding to the form of some single equation of the model (1) take a following example
equation,
yt = ￿Etyt+1 + ￿yt￿1 + y￿
t + ￿t (7)
where ￿t is a white noise shock and y￿
t is the fundament variable (possibly a complicated function of
several variables endogenous in the whole model), the development of which is outside the control of
the optimising agent in question. Hence, although endogenous in the full model, the development of
y￿
t is predetermined for the agent just like truly exogenous variables of the model. As no uncertainty
concerning the deep parameters of the underlying optimization framework was assumed, the decision
making agent also knows the correct parameterization of equation (7).
For our purposes it is useful to express the structural parameters of (7) in terms of its roots.















saddle path stability requires ￿ + ￿ < 1 that implies that j￿1j < 1 and j￿2j > 1. Now (7) can be
rewritten as,




t + ￿t) (8)
where L with Lxt = xt￿1refers to lag operator. Now (8) implies the following solution for the following
period expectations (see e.g. Sargent, 1979),

















































Equation (10) de￿nes Etyt+1 in terms of information concerning current period realization on
the dependent and fundament variables, on one hand, and the present value of expected changes of
the fundament variable. Conventional assumption is that Etyt = yt. which implies the stochastic
disturbance ￿t in (7) is known at the point of time when expectations are formed. This need not,ECB
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however, be true and, therefore, equation (11) presents the solution under the assumption that the
lagged endogenous and the current fundament are observable at the moment of expectation formation.
We return to this information issue later in this section.
Equation (9) implies the following current period solution,


















This form of writing equation (7) depicts well the information available to the agent. In line with
the information assumptions in underlying optimization the agent knows the ft term but not how
current and (possibly) lagged shocks hitting the economy are transmitted via the future changes
of the fundament variable ￿y￿
t+i to the expected present value term Et￿pvt+1. Econometricians
know that most economic time series are I(1) variables, which implies that one can ￿nd a stationary
ARMA(p,q) time series representation for their changes as, e.g.,
￿y￿





+   (L)et (14)
This gives the following Limited Information Minimal State Variable (LIMSV) presentation of equation
(13),
























If the forecasting agent knew all, what the econometrician knows, then she could use the LIMSV
solution of (15) for forecasting Etyt+1 in (7). However, we do not assume that the agent knows the
correctly speci￿ed ARMA(p,q) process and, hence, polynomials ￿(L) and ￿(L). In addition, also the
drift term ￿ may be regime dependent, for instance, with respect to the growth of technical progress
and/or population as well as the in￿ ation target of the central bank. The underlying information
assumptions of the NMCM, however, implies that the component ft is known. It coincides with the
LIMSV solution only if the ARMA(p,q) collapsed to ￿y￿
t = ￿ + et. However, the stationarity of (14)
implies that Et￿pvt+1 term converges to a constant ￿ and hence, ft + ￿ asymptotically converges
towards the LIMSV solution. Hence we specify the following PLM relation,











￿0t = ￿0t￿1 + "0t (17)
￿1t = ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿1t￿1 + "1t (18)










and ￿it ￿ 0. Parameter ￿0t accounts for the drift and
the adjustment dynamics of the unknown ARMA. The deviations of parameter ￿1t from unity are
related to the fact the ft￿1 does not coincide exactly with correctly speci￿ed LIMSV. However, in
line with the asymptotic properties of (14) parameter ￿1t in equation (18) is speci￿ed to converge to
unity with the speed determined by the size of parameter ￿ getting values in the interval [0;1]:
Now the PLM equation (16) implies the following forecasting equationECB
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where the most straight-forward would be to assume that Etyt = yt: This causes, however, si-
multaneity that is worsened by the fact that parameters ￿0t and ￿1t are also solved simultaneously
with yt. However, as discussed by Evans and Honkapohja (2001, Chapter 8.6) this problem can be
circumvented by assuming that yt is not included in the information set when forming expectations.
This assumption is frequently used in the literature on indeterminacy (e.g. Milani 2007, 2010). Now,
on the basis of equations (10) and (11) we re-de￿ne the square bracket term of (19) and end up with
the following forecast equation for updating learning expectations,


























Equation (20) together with (7) de￿nes the ALM.
3 Kalman ￿lter estimation of learning equations
Equations (16)-(18) form a state-space model where (16) is the measurement and (17)-(18) are the
transition equations and can be estimated by a Kalman ￿lter recursion. In matrix form it can be
presented as follows,
yt = Xt￿t + ut (21)
￿t = T￿t￿1 + ￿ + R"t (22)
where Xt = [1 (￿1yt￿1 + ￿2y￿




0 1 ￿ ￿
￿
, ￿ = [0 ￿]
0 R = I and
"t ￿ N (0;Qt).
Following Harvey (1992) and Rockinger and Urga (2000), the variance-covariance matrix associated
to ^ ￿t is: Pt = Et[(￿t ￿ ^ ￿t)(￿t ￿ ^ ￿t)0]. The best estimates of Pt conditional on information at t ￿ 1 is
Ptjt￿1 = TPt￿1T0 + RQtR
0
(23)
Denote the variance of the residual ut of the measurement equation by H = ￿2
u. Now the Kalman
updating equations become,













Equations (24)-(25) are the standard updating equations of the Kalman ￿lter. In (24) (yt￿1￿X0
t^ ￿tjt￿1)





t+H the Kalman gain.ECB
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3.1 Optimising parameter estimation
The Kalman ￿lter approach has the advantage of being very general, and can capture alternative
forms of learning. The likelihood function can be concentrated so that only the ratio of the variance
of the state equations to the measurement equations has to be estimated. Under the normalisation
of H = 1, then Qt becomes the signal to noise ratio. One learning algorithm used in the literature,
is recursive least squares estimation which corresponds in the Kalman ￿lter set-up to setting Qt = 0;
H = 1. In this case agents have in￿nite memory, with each observation being given equal weight.
As Qt rises agents e⁄ectively discount past observations more rapidly and the Kalman ￿lter becomes
equivalent to the constant gain algorithm used in the literature where agents give more weight to more
recent observations. The Q matrix is therefore a measure of the rate at which agents are willing to
update their forecasts. A higher Q means agents are more willing to learn and it also re￿ ects their
sensitivity to new information. However, there is a trade-o⁄from discounting past observations in that
there is a larger variance in the learning parameters, ￿t. This willingness to learn is a further source
of heterogeneity between economies. An alternative way to think about this is in terms of structural
change: when agents give more weight to recent observations, it suggests agents are concerned about
possible structural breaks in the past economic relationships. Indeed, the possibility of structural
change suggests using a value of Qt greater than zero.
As Milani (2005) shows, estimates vary strongly over a range of possible gain coe¢ cients. There-
fore, we follow Branch and Evans (2006) in estimating the degree of learning for each sector in each






(yi;t ￿ ^ yi;t)2 (26)
where ^ yi;t is the forecast of the i-th component based on t-1 information and P0 is set to a diagonal
in￿nity matrix, and then computing the Q matrix that minimises the in-sample MSE by doing a grid
search1. The value of Q which matters is its relative value compared with H, which is normalized to
be 1. As both are normal distributions a relative value of Q twice as large as H will provide very
rapid discounting with a half life of around 5 quarters. Higher values of Q would provide very volatile
estimates and hence our search of Q is restricted to the range 0.0 to 1.9. As one of the aims of the
model is to be used for forecasting, this method should provide the optimal forecasts given the model
speci￿cation.
One key aspect when setting-up the Kalman ￿lter updating mechanism concerns the initial values
(priors) for ^ ￿ and P0. In some cases it has been found that the dynamics of learning models are sensitive
to these choices, which adds a sense of arbitrariness that isn￿ t present in the rational expectation
solution, e.g. Slobodyan and Wouters (2009) ￿nd a crucial role of the initial beliefs to explain the
improved ￿t in their DSGE model.
In our case, we use starting values as their expected long-run values i.e. ￿0 =0 and ￿1=1.2 This
is consistent with our framework and it thus is a reasonable starting point for the estimation. We
also set P0 equal to a diagonal in￿nity matrix, i.e. we assign a large uncertainty to such initial beliefs
estimates.
1Alternatively we could have maximised the likelihood function, but as the likelihod function is basically made up
of the squared prediction errors this should give virtually the same result.
2Instead of estimating learning forecast equations for the expected levels of dependent variables we estimate them for
the expected changes. When the level form speci￿cation would imply the convergence of ￿0t towards a small constant,
the di⁄erence form speci￿cation implies convergence towards zero.ECB
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4 The Multi-Country Model Overview
The model used here is a new Multi-Country Euro Area Model (currently covering the 5 biggest euro
area countries) with Boundedly Estimated Rationality, see Dieppe, Gonzalez Pandiella and Willman
(2011). It was developed at the European Central Bank with the aim to match the key characteristics
of the economies as well as to be used to produce the country projections and to provide policy analysis.
The model has ￿rm micro-economic foundations with the theoretic core of the model containing one
exportable domestic good and one imported good. All central behavioural relations are based on the
optimisation behaviour of three private sector decision making units (i.e. households, labour unions
and ￿rms) and the reaction functions of the government sector and the central bank. Expectation
formation is treated explicitly and the model can be characterised as a limited-information - optimising
agent - New Keynesian model.
As the available data does not disaggregate government into a separate institutional sector, the
theoretical core of the model assumes a single domestic good produced by aggregated production
function with total employment and total capital stock as inputs. Hence, the optimisation framework
derives ￿true￿behavioural relations for total employment, investment, private consumption and cor-
responding de￿ ators and factor prices. For forecasting purposes, however, the accounting framework
of the model is markedly more disaggregated, although feedback e⁄ects on the longer-run adjustment
dynamics are speci￿ed via aggregate variables only.
The real world data which we have to confront stands in stark contrast to the predictions of
many simple macroeconomic models. In particular we would point out that a simple model with a
balanced growth path (BGP), as adopted e.g. by DSGE and other models related to the real business
cycle (RBC) paradigm, would predict that the GDP-shares of labour and total factor income as well
as the capital-output ratio are stationary. In the real data for our ￿ve countries this is clearly not
the case. Therefore, as discussed by McAdam and Willman (2008), Solow (2000) and Blanchard
(1997) we adopt a medium-run view regarding the underlying ￿trend￿developments of our data in
the sample period. Accordingly, the medium run developments, towards which the short-run dynamics
converges, are allowed to deviate from the BGP. However, this view does not exclude the possibility
that many processes, which from the medium run perspective may be advisable to treat as exogenous,
are from the very long-run perspective endogenous and drive the medium run development eventually
to converge to the BGP. Acemoglu (2002, 2003) gives an excellent example by showing that while
technical progress is necessarily labour-augmented along the BGP, it may become capital-augmented in
periods of transition re￿ ecting the interplay of innovation activities, factor intensities and pro￿tability.
Given a below-unitary substitution elasticity this pattern promotes the asymptotic stability of income
shares while precisely allowing them to ￿ uctuate in the medium run. Accordingly, we allow non-unitary
elasticity of substitution, non-constant augmenting technical progress and heterogeneous sectors with
di⁄erentiated price and income elasticities of demand across sectors. We achieve this by following
McAdam and Willman (2007 and 2008).
In addition to the relaxations concerning the medium-run development, the optimisation frame-
works of agents contain a lot of frictional elements which are needed for explaining realistically the
observed stylised short-run features. Labour is indivisible with important implications for the behav-
iour of all optimising agents. Regarding households￿utility maximisation problem the indivisibility
assumption simpli￿es the analysis, because the labour supply adjusts to the demand for labour con-
ditional on the wage contract set by unions maximising either the utility of member households or
targeting the warranted wage rate consistent with a desired employment rate. The basic framework in
household￿ s utility maximisation is Blanchard￿ s (1985) overlapping generation framework that, how-
ever, is supplemented in many ways. Firstly to incorporate income uncertainty in a tractable way into
the utility maximization framework we assume a two-stage approach in utility maximisation, Willman
(2007). In the ￿rst stage, the consumer evaluates her risk-adjusted non-human and human wealthECB
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conditional on uncertain lifespan and labour income. Thereafter, in the second stage, conditional
on the risk adjusted life-time resource constraint, the consumer is assumed to determine her optimal
planned path of consumption.
In the pro￿t maximising framework of the ￿rm the assumption of indivisible labour, adjustment
costs with respect to number of workers and convex costs with respect to work intensity introduce
the discrepancy between paid hours and e¢ cient hours. This explains the observed pro-cyclicality
in labour productivity, when labour input is measured in heads or paid hours. It also introduces
the ratio of e¢ cient hours (per worker) to normal hours into optimal price setting on the top of the
conventionally de￿ned marginal cost of labour. The price setting of ￿rms and the wage setting of
unions are staggered with three-valued Calvo-signal, McAdam and Willman (2007). Part of ￿rms
(unions) keep prices (wages) ￿xed, another part changes prices (wages) following a backward-looking
rule and the rest set them optimally. To capture the observed inertia in capital formation, capital
stock and its rate of change are coupled with adjustment costs. Regarding the stock formation ￿rms
minimise quadratic losses induced by the deviations of inventories, on the one hand, and production,
on the other hand, from their respective target levels related to the level of production implied by the
production function, when existing inputs are utilised at their normal (cost minimising) rates.
All euro area countries are open economies and, therefore, also in our theoretic single domestic good
framework a part of output is exported. However, ￿rms face separate demand functions in domestic
and export market leading to the pricing to market behaviour. This e⁄ectively separates the optimal
price setting of exports from the rest of the ￿rm￿ s optimisation problem. We assume that the volume
of exports is determined by the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) function. The advantage of this
functional form compared to the conventional iso-elastic form is that now, compatibly with empirical
evidence, the foreign competitors￿price a⁄ect optimal export-price setting. The export demand and
the optimal price setting form a two-equation system with cross-equation parameter constraints. This
allows a model consistent way to estimate the price elasticity of export demand. Import side of the
model is conventional being determined by domestic demand and the relative price of imports to
domestic good.
The steady state form of the ￿rst-order conditions of pro￿t maximising ￿rms and the utility of
member households maximising unions imply the 5-equation medium-run supply system that allows a
consistent two-step estimation of the underlying deep parameters of the model. As the supply system
contains cross-equation parameter constrains it is estimated with the method of non-linear SUR that
Le￿n-Ledesma et al. (2010) have proven to be a very e¢ cient estimation approach outperforming all
single-equation methods. This system de￿nes all parameters related to technology, production function
and the mark-up allowing to de￿ne optimal frictionless prices, wages, labour demand and marginal cost
and product concepts needed in estimating in the second stage the dynamic ￿rst order optimisation
conditions of ￿rms and unions. As the underlying framework is one of limited information, all dynamic
equations containing the expectations of variables are estimated by the generalised method of moment
(GMM).
In order to close the model the following additional relationships are required: a monetary policy
rule, a ￿scal policy rule and an exchange rate UIP rule. The model may be operated either with or
without these rules, typically in a forecast the rules would be turned o⁄ while in policy simulations
they are typically used. The ￿scal policy rule is based on a reaction of taxes to the Government￿ s debt
to GDP ratio. The ￿scal rule determines in the ￿rst place the path of the personal income tax rate.
Transfers to households are modelled as a function of the unemployment rate. The monetary policy
rule follows a simple Taylor rule speci￿cation in which the short term interest rate is determined by
the in￿ ation gap (where the in￿ ation gap measures the distance between the actual in￿ ation rate and
its target) and the output gap along with the lagged interest e⁄ect. The exchange rate follows a
standard forward-looking UIP equation. The key equations and parameters are in the appendix; see
our sister paper Dieppe, Gonzalez Pandiella, and Willman (2011) for more details.ECB
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5 Estimated forecast equations for learning expectations
We now proceed to present the learning estimation results following the approach outlined in section
(2.2) and (3). We apply it to the six main forward looking stochastic equations which are: con-
sumption, price (GPP de￿ ator) and wage in￿ ation, investment, employment and inventories3. The
uncovered interest rate parity condition for the real exchange rate contains also the expected forward
exchange rate. However to retain the intrinsically forward looking nature of ￿nancial markets, this
expectation is treated as rational.
The tables below present the key parameters for the learning equations4 estimated since 1993Q1.
For the time-varying parameters, ￿0t and ￿1t the table shows the end point of the parameter estimate
(i.e. 2007Q2)5. We report ￿1, ￿2 and for the wage and price equations which include an additional
lag, ￿3, which as in (20) are expressed in terms of the roots of the estimated forward looking equation.
We also report the hyper-parameter for the Q matrix, obtained by minimizing the in-sample MSE6.
The higher this parameter, the higher the variability in ￿t and provides a re￿ ection of structural
change in those estimations. Finally, we report the in-sample R2, which gives an indication of ￿t of
the equations. The speed of convergence parameter, ￿, in (22) was selected to be 0.03.
5.1 Employment expectations
Labour demand has a one lagged and a long-run (desired) number of workers, which is derived from
the inverted production function.





where nt = log (number employed), and n￿
t = log(N￿
t ) (inverted production function ￿see equation
34).
Learning Employment Estimation
DE FR IT ES NL
￿0 0.0003 0.0002 0.0005 0.0009 0.0012
￿1 0.8481 0.9748 0.8106 0.9211 0.8049
￿1 0.6803 0.7475 0.6292 0.4767 0.7475
￿2 0.3197 0.2525 0.3708 0.5233 0.2525
Q 0.2000 0.0000 0.0150 0.0035 0.1000
R2 0.7380 0.5171 0.5968 0.8562 0.9690
5.2 Investment expectations
Capital accumulation re￿ ects time to build considerations see section A.3.2 .








3Expected HICP excluding energy is formed by a weighted average of the GDP de￿ator imports de￿ator excluding
energy, pMN
t and indirect energy prices.
4A number of expected variables are derived from these key estimated expectations - e.g. expected consumer prices
are a weighted average of expected GDP factor prices and import prices.
5Although clearly they continue to evolve as new information comes into place.
6For Wages in Spain and Employment in France we started the estimation in 1997q1. This implied that the Q
parameter was zero for these variables and was done to avoid undesirable roots. This approach is a minimal restriction
compared to the alternative approach of projection facility Evans and Honakpohja (2001) which in e⁄ect restricts beliefs
to a smaller neighbourhood.ECB
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where kt is log of capital stock, ￿k￿
t = MPKt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)UCt + (1 ￿ d)(1 ￿ ￿)[￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)], MPK
is marginal product of capital and UC is the real user cost of capital.
Learning Investment Estimation
DE FR IT ES NL
￿0 -0.0003 0.0013 -0.0002 0.0021 0.0002
￿1 0.9805 1.0000 1.0116 0.8928 0.9232
￿1 0.4830 0.6207 0.6078 0.6138 0.3928
￿2 1.6950 1.7879 1.7796 1.7834 1.6267
Q 2.0000 2.0000 0.2000 0.3000 0.5000
R2 0.9125 0.9033 0.3304 0.8600 0.8400
5.3 Consumption expectations
Household consumption follows an optimized framework with overlapping generations ￿see section
(A.4). The expectation equation consistent with this equation is:








t = (￿yYt + ￿vVt), Yt is real labour income, and Vt is private sector total real wealth.
Note that in equilibrium with ￿1t = 1 terms ￿2
1￿￿1￿y and ￿2
1￿￿1￿vequals the quarterly marginal
propensities to consume out of labour income and wealth, respectively.
Learning Consumption Estimation
DE FR IT ES NL
￿0 0.0042 0.0017 0.0008 0.0048 0.0195
￿1 0.9998 1.0001 0.9997 1.0002 0.9988
￿1 0.7428 0.8464 0.8718 0.7286 0.8071
￿2 14.4081 17.1154 7.6845 10.3162 8.8344
￿y 0.0140 0.0079 0.0110 0.0221 0.0155
￿v 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003
Q 0.0005 0.0040 0.0015 0.0750 0.0050
R2 0.9337 0.9947 0.9790 0.9982 0.9939
5.4 Price expectations
Price equations follow the three-valued Calvo-signal, see equation (47), so that the expectation equa-
tion becomes:





where pt = gdp factor cost prices (log); p￿
t = wt ￿mpnt +ah (n￿
t ￿ nt)+￿t = frictionless equilibrium
price level (log); wt = compensation per worker (log); mpnt= marginal product of labour (log); n￿
t =
optimal number of workers (log) and nt = actual employment (log);ECB
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Learning Price Estimation
DE FR IT ES NL
￿0 0.0003 0.0021 0.0011 0.0022 0.0059
￿1 0.7967 0.9220 0.7525 0.7993 0.6055
￿1 0.5871 0.4987 0.4186 0.2588 0.3151
￿2 0.2592 0.2127 0.1723 0.0976 0.1230
￿3 0.6721 0.7140 0.7538 0.8388 0.8079
Q 0.0375 0.0000 0.0175 0.0125 0.0000
R2 0.6998 0.5832 0.7432 0.3780 0.3214
5.5 Wage expectations
As with prices, wages follow the three-valued Calvo-signal, with expectations based on frictionless
equilibrium price level:











￿ ￿ 1 + MPNt
Yt=Nt
￿








per worker; MPNt= marginal product of labour; n￿
t = optimal (desired) number of workers (log); nF
t
= labour force (log).
Learning Wage Estimation
DE FR IT ES NL
￿0 0.0005 0.0006 0.0030 0.0026 0.0030
￿1 0.8474 0.8888 0.6543 0.9438 0.7087
￿1 0.7790 0.4615 0.4371 0.5057 0.3598
￿2 0.3666 0.1937 0.1815 0.2163 0.1439
￿3 0.5876 0.7323 0.7444 0.7106 0.7841
Q 0.0150 0.0200 0.0075 0.0000 0.0050
R2 0.8468 0.7108 0.6306 0.8992 0.5565
5.6 Inventories expectations
The desired equilibrium inventory stock KII￿ is based on the estimated CES production function and
the dynamic equation re￿ ects adjustment costs see equation (57) so the learning equation becomes:





where KIIt = inventory stock.
Learning Inventories Estimation￿
DE FR IT ES NL
￿0 -391.7 564.9 220.0 487.3 245.3
￿1 1.1662 0.8751 1.0979 1.0118 1.0749
￿1 0.1516 0.4986 0.1678 0.1153 0.2139
￿2 0.8714 3.9621 0.9615 0.6781 1.2353
Q 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.5233 0.2378 0.2642 0.1546 0.2528ECB
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5.7 Learning Estimation observations
In general, the ￿1t coe¢ cient at 2007Q2 are close to 1, supporting the choice of using this form of the
learning expectation rule. The main exceptions are the price equations where the ￿1t parameters are
lower (wages for the Netherlands is another exception).
There is quite some variability in the Q hyper-parameter across countries and equations, with
estimates suggest a forgetting half-life of between 5 and 70 or more quarters. Looking at the variables,
investment has a high Q hyper-parameter suggesting ￿rms respond quickly to news to update their
estimates whereas for consumption there is a longer half-life.
In general there is only small changes in the ￿1t parameters over time with larger changes in the
￿ot parameter. However, the variation in the parameters has an impact on the simulation results (see
later). Overall, the estimation by Kalman ￿lter provided a very good ￿t of data. This can be seen as
being attributable to two factors, ￿rstly the movement in parameters provides an additional degree
of freedom, which captures variation, and secondly, the equations are optimised by minimising the
squared error. The worse ￿ts tend to be for the investment and inventory equations, with some R2 of
less than 0.8. Comparing the overall ￿t of the structural model equations under rational versus learning
expectations we ￿nd little di⁄erences, suggesting the learning approach is a valid representation.
6 Scenario analysis
Above we have presented our learning framework and estimates under the assumption that agents
have limited information. It is interesting to see how the interactions between the agents occur in
the context of the full model and hence informative to do some shock/scenario - analysis. However,
in undertaking scenario analysis it is important to consider exactly what underlying assumptions are
required. Namely, it is important to consider what information set agents have, i.e. do households
and ￿rms have the same information set as Central Banks and Governments, or are there information
asymmetries; is the shock anticipated or unanticipated, and ￿nally it is important to distinguish
between transitory and permanent shocks.
We will consider in this section, two alternative approaches to expectation formation. The ￿rst
approach is the bounded rationality approach outlined above, where agents learn about the shocks and
how the economy responds to those shocks. Under this approach we assume the Central Bank follows
a Taylor rule, where it adopts the private agents￿expectations for in￿ ation rather than assuming the
Central Bank has more information than private sector agents, or even full information7. However,
we assume the real exchange rate follows a forward-looking, model-consistent UIP8.
The second approach, for comparative purposes is the case of perfect foresight (model consistent)
rationality where all agents have the same information set and know the duration of the shock and
how the Central Bank and indeed the economy will react to the shock. In this approach, agents adjust
their behaviour as soon as a change is anticipated, we call this ￿ announced and credible￿shock. In this
case where expectations are assumed to be fully rational with perfect foresight, the future expected
value is simply replaced by the model future realisations and the model solved iteratively, such that
the expectations are fully model consistent, i.e. expected outcomes are replaced with model outcomes:
Etyt+1 = yt+1 (33)
7Preston (2005) argues in favour of policy rules based on the bank￿ s own forecast as he showed that if central bank
adopt the private agents￿expectations for its decisions without considering how they are formed, it may result in a
self-ful￿lling expectation problem and macroeconomic instabllity. The implications of replacing the expected in￿ation
in the Talyor rule with either another rule, or the model-consistent rational expectations outcome are left for future
work.
8The learning model can currently be simulated using a learning based UIP rule, but this clearly has di⁄erent
properties to the rational, model-consistent UIP. Using the latter could be interpreted as assuming rationality in the
asset market.ECB
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For each country we have created a steady state baseline over a su¢ ciently long time horizon to
enable us to perform standard shock simulations and to study the model properties. The comparative
simulation analysis is undertaken over a horizon of 250 years9.
We consider 5 di⁄erent shocks covering a monetary policy shock, a demand shock and a supply
shock, all occurring at time t:
1. Short-term interest rate shock - de￿ned as a 50 b.p. increase in the short-term interest rate for
1 period followed by an interest rate rule.
2. Permanent Government expenditure shock ￿ speci￿ed as a 0.5% of GDP increase in public
consumption over the entire simulation horizon.
3. Permanent Technology (TFP) shock such that potential output is up by 1% over the entire
horizon.
4. Permanent appreciation of the euro nominal exchange rate by 5% against all foreign currencies
and
5. Permanent world demand shock of 1 per cent increase in extra euro area import demand.
We do the scenarios in single country mode, where there are no cross-country trade linkages and
monetary policy and exchange rates react to single economy domestic developments. The simulations
are presented in the ￿gures at the end of the paper, where the results are presented as deviations from
baseline, (real variables and employment are expressed as percentages deviations; prices as di⁄erences
in year-on-year in￿ ation rates and for interest rates, savings ratio, ￿scal de￿cit, and unemployment,
they are expressed as absolute deviations, either in percentage points or percent of GDP). We present
results for the 5 estimated countries and consider the mechanisms and implications for the 5 shocks
in turn.
6.1 One period shock to Interest Rates
We start by considering the reaction of the economy to a 1 period shock to the short-term interest
rate followed by the Taylor rule. We consider the credibly announced rational expectations case
where agents know that it is only a one period shock followed by a Taylor rule reaction. We compare
it with the model simulated under learning. Figure 1 shows the response of the economy to this
shock. In both cases, both demand and prices initially fall, but then start to return back to base
as increased competitiveness aided by lower interest rates boost the economy. Under the rational /
model consistent expectations scenario, although demand reacts quicker the responses are qualitative
similar. However, the initial price responses are much larger than the learning and less persistent.
This is because the learning model to some extent adds more frictions dampening the initial e⁄ects, so
the model become more like a backward-looking model. However, while the initial e⁄ects are di⁄erent,
the adjustment paths are similar. This ￿nding is similar to Slobodyan and Wouters (2009), who ￿nd
the main di⁄erences under learning compared with the rational expectations are on the price side in
their DSGE model.
6.2 Permanent government consumption shock
As noted by Van Brusselen (2009), there is no consensus on the response of the economy to a ￿scal
policy expansion. Indeed estimates in the literature vary widely depending on the model used. As
9Under rational expectations long simulation horizons ensures that the early part of the simulation path is (at most)
marginally a⁄ected by the choice of terminal conditions. See Dieppe et al (2011) for more details.ECB
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the ￿scal block is quite extensive we can consider expansionary ￿scal policy through alternative in-
struments, but in this section we focus purely on an expansion in government expenditure. Figure 2
shows the impact of a permanent shock to Government consumption of 0.5% of GDP under learning
and under perfect foresight. The ￿scal rule, which is crucial from the standpoint of the sustainable
development of government debt is operational, so government debt will return to previous levels,
￿nanced by higher taxes. In both cases, the impact of increasing government consumption by 0.5%
of GDP is to initially increase GDP by around 0.5% of GDP, but subsequently there is strong crowd-
ing out due to higher interest rates, and hence higher cost of capital which reduces both investment
and consumption as well as helps to reduce the surge in in￿ ation. Furthermore, consistent with the
uncovered interest rate parity condition, the shock triggers a depreciation of the domestic currency,
thus boosting export demand. The initial depreciation of the currency re￿ ects the fact that in spite
of the initial rise of the interest rate it later decrease below the baseline and forces the real exchange
rate to appreciate back to the baseline.
There are cross-country di⁄erences, both in the initial impact as well as the dynamics, see Figure
4. The di⁄erences are due to a variety of factors including openness of the economy, responsiveness to
monetary policy, degree of ￿nancing constraints, perceived response of the Central Bank and perceived
state of the economy. However, in general, cross-country di⁄erences are broadly similar between the
rational and the learning versions.
In comparing the learning and the rational expectations approach, we notice that the learning
model is stable and converging to the rational expectations solution. However, as also previously
shown, the model with the learning process exhibits very di⁄erent properties from a model with
rational expectations with clear di⁄erences in the adjustment path to equilibrium. Indeed, the model
seems to support the work of Orphanides and Williams (2004), who showed in a small model for
in￿ ation that policies which are e¢ cient under rational expectations are not when agents use a learning
process. We also see that the crowding out e⁄ects are much quicker and stronger in the anticipated
rational expectations approach than under learning. Furthermore, monetary policy takes time to
react, as the Central Bank learns about the duration of the shock. In the literature on learning it has
become increasingly obvious that learning as opposed to rational expectations can impose a di⁄erent
set of constraints on how policy should be formulated. For recent surveys of this literature see Evans
and Honkapohja(2008) and Bullard(2006). Indeed, it is also possible that some monetary policy rules
can give rise to multiple REE and that the economy may not settle on the most desirable one, see
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004) and Evans and McGough (2005). The key insight of this literature is
that monetary policy can have, in e⁄ect, a new role; to facilitate the learning process itself. One area
of further investigation is to study the optimal monetary policy rule under learning as opposed to
rational expectations in this model.
6.3 Other simulations
In addition to the two shocks above we also report the simulation results of an appreciation of the
euro, a permanent world demand shock and a supply shock in the form of two technology shocks.
As we have a CES production function, we consider both a shock to labour augmenting technical
progress and a shock to capital augmenting, such that ceteris paribus potential output is permanently
higher by 0.1% ￿i.e. the economy can produce more output for a given labour and capital. As with
the previous simulations, after these shocks, there is an adjustment to a new equilibrium which is the
same in the rational and the learning. However the key di⁄erences remain - more sluggish adjustment,
particularly on the nominal side, which is a similar ￿nding to Slobodyan and Wouters (2009).ECB
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6.4 Fiscal policy expansion under alternative expectations
Using our framework, we are able to illustrate the impact of di⁄erent expectation assumptions. In
doing this it is important to distinguish between transitory and permanent shocks, as clearly the
response of the economy will depend on the duration of the shock hitting the economy. In this section
we explore this in more detail.
A shock to the economy is by de￿nition always unanticipated. However, in the case of a change of
policy, consideration is needed as to whether the changes in policy are announced or unannounced and
whether they are credible or uncredible. So far in the rational expectations perfect foresight case we
have considered an announcement at point t where the future path of policy is fully credible and hence
anticipated. We call this credibly announced rationality as agents know the future path of shocks and
change their behaviour in advance. Whilst there are rigidities, the adjustments are therefore quick.
An alternative approach is of an unannounced or uncredible policy change. In this case, the
information set is the same for all agents, but is one of protracted surprises, i.e. expectations will
repeatedly not be ful￿lled and agents will be surprised every period as they do not know the duration
of the shock (for example a government continuously surprising ￿rms and households). Therefore
agents re-optimise each period as new information becomes available. This may to some extent be
considered at odds with the rational expectations approach that does not allow systematic recurrent
errors, but is a quite common approach in DSGE modelling.
The rationality assumption used in these two approaches are in some ways extreme: either there
is full credibility or zero credibility and agents are continuously surprised. An alternative, perhaps
more plausible case is that credibility is acquired, which is the learning approach. Indeed, in some
ways, the learning approach is between these two approaches, in that agents are surprised, but are not
continuously surprised and gradually learn about the shocks (e.g. if it is permanent or temporary)
and adjust their behaviour accordingly. Therefore, we also compare learning to other extreme where
agents know the model, but they don￿ t know the future path of the shock. The learning approach
would be expected to converge to the anticipated rationality solution.
We consider a temporary shock to government expenditure of 0.5% of GDP for 3 years after which
government expenditure returns to back to base.10 In all cases, the initial shock is unanticipated.
Under the credibly announced scenario, both households, ￿rms the central bank and the government
know the duration of the shock. They therefore anticipate that debt-￿nanced expenditures will lead to
higher taxes. The second case we consider is where the change in government policy is unannounced
or uncredible. In this case agents expect the government to return expenditure to their previous level
of government spending, and agents are continuously surprised by the government, i.e. sequentially
surprised. In this case, we also assume that the central bank has the same information set as the
private agents and is also continuously surprised, and monetary policy reactions re￿ ects this. Finally,
the third case considered is the learning, bounded rationality, where agents don￿ t know the duration
of the shock, but learn about it, and subsequently are not continuously surprised. Figure 9 shows
reactions under the three approaches.
The dynamics are quite di⁄erent across the three di⁄erent cases. In the ￿rst case, of credibly
announced change in government spending, under model consistent expectations, agents react imme-
diately to the shock and adjust their behaviour according, with quick crowding out, particularly for
investment, higher interest rates, but also crowding out by households due to negative wealth e⁄ect
on private consumption in anticipation of higher (future) tax burdens. Furthermore there are strong
in￿ ationary pressures in the ￿rst year. In the second case, where the duration of increased government
spending is unannounced or uncredible the impact on the economy is di⁄erent, with initially less in-
￿ ationary pressures, and less crowding out in the second and third years. In the learning expectations
10An alternative assumption is that agents assume there is some persistent in Government spending, so instead of an
immediate return to some baseline level, agents could assume government expenditure folows an AR(1) process.ECB
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case, where agents learn about the duration of the shock, the in￿ ationary reaction is initially small -
and similar to unnannounced / uncredible scenario, but as agents realise the shock is more persistent
prices start to react quicker - more in line with the credible scenario. Private demand, particularly
consumption, however reacts less and consequently after 3 years the boost in demand from increased
government consumption is larger.
6.5 Time-variation in scenarios
As well as di⁄erences in the treatment of expectations, the impact of an expansionary ￿scal policy
potentially depends on the state of the economy, and the perceived (expected) state of the economy.
In this respect, using the bounded-rationality framework, the simulations in ￿gures 10 to 14 show
the impact of starting the shock in 1999Q1, through to starting the shock in 2009Q4. The reported
time frame is 8 quarters. Figures 10 and 11 show the response to an Interest rate shock of 50 basis
points with exogenous exchange rates. The simulation shows that since 1999, in￿ ation sensitivity to an
interest rate shock has increased, which maybe interpreted as an increase in Central Bank credibility.
However it is notable that the real e⁄ects remain basically the same over this period due to no essential
change in real wage responses. This variation over time in the in￿ ation process is due to the learning
mechanism as agents adjust their expectations in response to the shocks hitting the economy, i.e.
di⁄erent parameters in the expectation equations. Figures 12 and 13 show the impact of a permanent
increase in government expenditure, with monetary accommodation (i.e. exogenous interest rates
and exchange rates). Price ￿ exibility seems to have increased over the last 12 years in response to a
demand shock, which results in faster crowding out of real e⁄ects. Secondly, the responsiveness of the
economy to ￿scal stimulus seems to vary over time, increasing during downturns (e.g. 2001), which is
particularly noticeable during the recent period (2009). This is because the economy has some slack,
i.e. is not being fully utilized and agents adjust their expectations to re￿ ect this.
The scenarios analysis presented here are illustrative, and as our ￿scal block is quite extensive we
can do a range of alternative scenarios, e.g. a reduction in income tax, consumption tax or ￿rm￿ s social
security payments or an increase in government transfers, and in a subsequent paper we consider the
implications of coordinated versus uncoordinated ￿scal expansion in the linked version of the model.
7 Conclusions
The learning approach to expectations is often criticised for being arbitrary. In this paper we have
presented a limited information learning approach where each group of agents knows only the parame-
ters related to their optimization problem but need not know the rest of the model nor the stochastic
exogenous processes driving the model. Furthermore, as Milani (2005), has shown the learning esti-
mates can vary strongly over di⁄erent gain coe¢ cients, therefore we optimised the key gain parameter,
with the implicit assumption that agents choose the ￿ best performing rule￿ .
We have applied this learning framework to a new multi-country model consisting of three private
sector decision making units, i.e. ￿rms, trade unions and households. These agents are optimising but
based on a limited information. Indeed, the core of the model is estimated with GMM that implicitly
assumes boundedly rational expectations and thus consistent with the learning approach. It is for this
reason that it is our preferred approach as the main speci￿cation for the model.
We have shown that under these assumptions, expectations based on learning (weak rationality),
converges to the perfect foresight, (strong rationality) solution. However, there are strong di⁄erences
in the adjustment path of the economy to an expansionary ￿scal policy. Furthermore, under our
framework, the behaviour of the economy varies depending on the state of the economy and agents
perceptions of the future.ECB
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Overall, we have aimed to outline a coherent and realistic framework for learning in limited in-
formation medium-scale models. However, further research is needed to better to understand the
importance of the information assumptions in the model.
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A Appendix: The Model Framework
The theoretical core of the model consists of three optimising private sector decision making units, i.e.
utility maximising households, pro￿t maximising ￿rms and trade unions, which minimise the quadratic
loss function under the staggered wage adjustment assumption. Monopolistically competing ￿rms set
prices, inventories and factor demands under the assumptions of indivisible labour. Output is in the
short run demand-determined. Monopoly unions set wages and overlapping generation households
make consumption/saving decisions. In the rest of this section we present the model equations. The
detailed theoretical framework is in Dieppe et al (2011).
A.1 The Normalised CES production function























where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, ￿0 distribution parameter
equalling the capital share evaluated at the normalization point (subscript 0) and ￿i (t;t0) de￿ne the
(indexed) level of technical progress associated to factor i (with ￿i (t0;t0) = 1). Technical progress











where i = N; K. and the log level of technical progress, ￿i ( ￿) is, therefore, a function of time,
t (around its normalization point, t0), a curvature parameter, ￿i, and has a growth rate of ￿i at the
representative point of normalization11.
A.2 The supply system
The behaviour of pro￿t maximizing ￿rms and the member households ￿ utility maximizing trade unions









￿ log(1 + ￿(t)) = 0 (36)
11Note we scaled the Box-Cox speci￿cation by t0 to interpret ￿N and ￿K as the rates of labour- and capital-
augmenting technical change at the ￿xed (i.e., representative) point.ECB













































































































































where Y, N and K refer to output, employment and capital. Py, w and q are their respective
prices; C, Pc and N F are consumption, consumption de￿ ator and labour force. Bars above the
variables refer to the sample averages. Normalised production function implies that
*
￿ =
￿ q ￿ K
￿ w ￿ N+￿ q ￿ K is
the capital share evaluated at the ￿xed point (sample mean).
Production Function Estimates
FR DE IT ES NL
Elasticity of Substitution 0.532 0.614 0.614 0.55 0.575
All dynamic equations containing the leads of variables are estimated by the generalised method
of moment (GMM) that is compatible with the assumption of bounded rationality12.
A.3 Firms
A.3.1 Labour Demand
The desired (optimal) number of workers, N￿






















Total wage costs can be presented as a convex function of the deviation of e⁄ective hours, ht from
normal hours, ￿ h = 1 :
12The instruments used in estimation are lags of dependent, driving and other relevant variables.ECB







￿ (ht ￿ 1)2
i
(42)






Now the dynamic system of ￿rst order conditions imply the following labour demand:
nt =
Dt
(1 + Dt + ah=aN)
nt+1 +
1
(1 + Dt + ah=aN)
nt￿1 +
ah=aN

















2￿￿ = discounting factor (￿ 1)
A.3.2 Investment formation
Capital accumulation re￿ ects time-to-build considerations. As with employment, we de￿ne the ad-








￿ ￿Kt￿1￿kt￿1 ￿ aKbK ￿ ￿Kt￿kt￿1 (45)
where k = logK and bK 2 [0; 1].











































￿B = LG-multiplier related to the borrowing constraint; ￿= the debt to capital stock ceiling ratio
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1; MPK = marginal product of capital; UC = real user cost of capital; ￿I= LG-multiplier
related to the irreversibility of investment ; and aK and bK are adjustment cost parameters.ECB
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A.3.3 Price formation
Price and wage setting are staggered with three-valued Calvo-signal resulting in a conventional hybrid
New Keynesian Phillips curve as in Gali and Gertler (1999):
f￿p + !p [1 ￿ ￿p (1 ￿ ￿)]g￿pt ￿ !p￿pt￿1 ￿ ￿￿p￿pt+1
￿ (1 ￿ !p)(1 ￿ ￿p)(1 ￿ ￿￿p)(p￿
t ￿ pt) = 0 (47)
where pt = log of gdp de￿ ator at factor costs; p￿
t = wt ￿ mpnt + ah (n￿
t ￿ nt) + ￿t = log of the
frictionless equilibrium price level; wt = log of compensation per worker; mpnt= log of the marginal
product of labour (<= production function); n￿
t = optimal number of workers (log), nt = actual
employment (log); ah is the overtime premium parameter determined by (42) and aggregate mark-up
￿(t) is determined by the system 36-40. ￿p is the probability that ￿rms don￿ t change their prices, and
!p is the probability prices are changed following a backward-looking rule. In estimation we assumed
the four per cent annual discount rate, which in quarterly data implies ￿ = 0:99.








t is the pre-tax HICP excluding energy, tci is the current implicit tax rate and tcir is the
tax rate in the base year of price indices. We model the seasonal adjusted version of pHXT
t , so-called
pHXST
t where the seasonal factors are estimated using a time-varying airline estimation procedure
and kept ￿xed over the forecast horizon. We retain the Calvo price framework and parameters from
above:












t is the seasonal adjusted version of pHXT
t , and pHXST￿
t is the long-run optimal non-
energy HICP and is weighted average of the optimal GDP de￿ ator p￿
t including indirect energy prices
and imports de￿ ator excluding energy, pMN
t where the weights ￿1 are estimated by OLS and % is set




t + (1 ￿ ￿1)((1 ￿ %)p￿
t + %pEI
t ) + ah (n￿
t ￿ nt) (50)
HICP energy (pHE
t ) is modelled as a mark-up of energy prices (or oil) and GDP de￿ ator (pt):
pHE
t = ￿1pEI
t + (1 ￿ ￿1)(pt) (51)
The overall HICP pH
t ;then becomes a weighted average of HICP non-energy (post-tax), pHX
t and
HICP energy, pHE
t where wet is the weight of HICP energy in the overall HICP.
pH
t = wet ￿ pHE
t + (1 ￿ wet) ￿ pHX
t (52)
The consumption de￿ ator is linked via a simple bridge equation to seasonally adjusted HICP. All
other domestic de￿ ators (e.g. investment de￿ ator) are speci￿ed as quasi-identities, i.e. modelled as
weighted averages of domestic costs (measured by the value-added de￿ ator de￿ned above) and import
prices (measured by the import de￿ ator).ECB
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A.3.4 Wage Setting
Wages are also set via a staggered with three-valued Calvo-signal where part of unions keep wages
￿xed, ￿w, another part changes wages following backward-looking rule, !w, and the rest set them
optimally:
f￿w + !w [1 ￿ ￿w (1 ￿ ￿)]g￿wt = !w￿wt￿1 + ￿￿wEtwt+1
+ (1 ￿ !w)(1 ￿ ￿w)(1 ￿ ￿￿w)fw￿
t ￿ wtg
(53)
where wt = log of compensation per worker, and ￿; the discount factor, = 0:99. For the optimal
frictionless wage rate, w￿

















































where ct = consumption (log), pC
t = consumption de￿ ator (log) ; F￿1 (￿) = inverted CES produc-
tion function ( desired number of workers); NF
t = labour force and the gap between optimal labour
demand and supply measures the wage drift e⁄ect. 13.
A.3.5 Inventory investment
The desired equilibrium inventory stock KII￿ is based on the estimated CES production function:
KII = a + bF (K;N;t) (56)
and inventories from the dynamic equation:
(1 ￿ r ￿ A)￿KIIt = (1 ￿ 2A)￿KII￿
t
￿ A[￿St ￿ ￿KIIt ￿ ￿F (￿)] + (1 ￿ r)A[￿St+1 ￿ ￿KIIt+1 ￿ ￿F (￿;t + 1)] (57)
S= Sales (Private consumption + exports)
A.4 Households
















￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
RtCt+1
Yt




























zt = 0 (58)
13For the simulations in the paper we assume all unions to be non-utilitarian.ECB
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where Ct is consumption, Yt labour income net of payroll taxes minus transfers, Vt￿1total wealth
in the beginning of period. Parameter ￿= death probability; ￿= forward information parameter; a=
habit persistence parameter; ￿= income risk parameter and zt refers to the set of instruments.























where PI, PC , PS and PH are investment de￿ ator, consumption de￿ ator, stock prices and the
market price of housing, respectively. KSR is total capital stock, KGR is government sector capital
stock and sH is the share of housing stock of total private capital stock, and b0 and b1 are the elasticity
parameters
A.5 Trade formation




) = a + b ￿ f(time) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)(pX ￿ pCX) (60)
pX = a +
1 + (a + b ￿ f (time))=(￿ ￿ 1)
2 + (a + b ￿ f (time))=(￿ ￿ 1)
((1 ￿ ax)(w ￿ mpn) + axpM)
+
1
2 + (a + b ￿ f (time))=(￿ ￿ 1)
pCX (61)
Where PX = Export de￿ ator (lower case refers to log); X = Export volume; PCX= the external
competitor export prices (lower case refers to log); MF = the world demand for exports; w = com-
pensation per worker (log); mpn = marginal product of labour (log); pM = import de￿ ator (log),
a = point market share; ￿ > 1 is the representative point price elasticity of exports; b if di⁄erent
from zero measures the deviation of income elasticity of export demand from unity; and aX = import
content of exports (input-output estimate).
The dynamic export volume and export price equation follow conventional error correction equa-
tions.
The long-run equilibrium aggregate demand for imports:
m￿ ￿ eMR = k(pMD ￿ pMN) + b(x ￿ eMR) (62)
where eMR is the demand indicator for imports (import content weighted index of domestic de-
mand); pMD is domestic prices (gdp de￿ ator); and pMN is import prices excluding energy; (all logs).
The dynamic equation follows a standard EC speci￿cation.
The import de￿ ator excluding energy pMN depends on the GDP de￿ ator net of indirect taxes (p)
and the competitors￿import price (pCM)
pMN = ￿1(p + log(1 ￿ TX1)) + (1 ￿ ￿1)pCM (63)
The dynamic equation follows a standard EC speci￿cation. The trade balance and net factor
income equal the current account balance, which in turn is cumulated to give the stock of net foreign
assets.ECB
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A.6 Parameter Estimates
FR DE IT ES NL
Employment ah=aN 0.0225 0.0388 0.0559 0.1414 0.0396
Investment 1 ￿ ￿
B 0.5087 0.4517 0.5067 0.5876 0.376
bK 0.7879 0.695 0.7796 0.7834 0.6267
1=aK 0.0126 0.0122 0.0129 0.0139 0.0163
￿I 0.25 0.26 0.2 0.25 0.33
a 0.8 0.8 0.855 0.8 0.75
NKPC ￿p 0.7455 0.7646 0.7251 0.6705 0.6926
!p 0.3531 0.3831 0.3235 0.2543 0.2807
ah 0.7515 0.399 0.1797 0.4212 0.4109
HICP energy/non energy ￿1 0.21 0.15 0.1 0.033 0.17
￿1 0.33 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.35
NKPC Wage ￿w 0.7364 0.7982 0.7301 0.7471 0.7077
!w 0.3396 0.4412 0.3306 0.3555 0.2999
￿ 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.15 0.11
awu 0.3 0.15 0.5366 0.2234 0.1745
Inventory A 0.4705 0.3374 0.3501 0.3038 0.3802
Consumption ￿ 0.005 0.007 0.0053 0.0053 0.0053
￿ 0.8138 0.7923 0.6144 0.7192 0.6665
a 0.9303 0.8715 0.9467 0.864 0.9098
￿ 0.9031 0.8002 0.6711 0.8522 0.7196
b0,b1 - 0.2828 0.2036 0.2388 0.336
2-equation export system a 1.08 1.131 1.051 1.05 1.025
ł 1.021 1.056 1.220 1.314 1.345
aX 0.385 0.167 0.400 0.465 0.672
Dynamic export MF 0.846 0.745 0.663 0.68 0.926




EC ￿ term -0.152 -0.42 -0.157 -0.165 -0.088
Dynamic export price ￿P












EC ￿ term -0.328 -0.097 -0.171 -0.548 -0.11
Import k -0.782 -0.711 -1.001 -0.979 -0.576
b 0.312 0.284 - 0.293 0.072
Dynamic Import ￿m
￿ - 0.813 0.568 0.561 0.722
￿mt￿2 - - 0.132 - -
￿eMR 0.642 - - - -
EC ￿ term -0.235 -0.121 -0.117 0.164 -0.229
Import price ￿1 0.333 0.416 0.225 0.312 0.667
Dynamic Import price ￿p
￿
MN 0.498 0.673 0.427 0.669 0.74
￿p
￿
MN;t￿1 0.344 0.237 - - -
￿p
￿
MN;t￿2 0.179 - - - -
￿pMN;t￿1 - 0.189 0.158 - 0.26
EC ￿ term -0.118 -0.148 -0.235 -0.417 -0.16ECB
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A.7 Governments and Monetary Authority
Government receipts are split into a number of components: direct taxes on households earned income
(Tf); direct taxes on ￿rms (To), and indirect taxes (TI), and other public income (OIG) and (net)
transfers (TRF). Transfers as a proportion of nominal GDP (tr) are modelled as:
TRF = tr:PY ￿ {W(N ￿ Nbas) (64)
where { is calibrated to 0.7. In addition, the ￿scal authority has net interest payments on gov-
ernment debt (ING) and di⁄erent types of primary expenditure categories, namely, government con-
sumption (GN) and government investment (ING) which are exogenous in real terms. The government
consumption de￿ ator follows both the price of home produced goods with a weight of ￿
G and of im-
ported goods with a weight of (1-￿
G) .The public de￿cit (D) each period is then the di⁄erence between
the recipts and expenditures:
D = TF + To + TI + OIG ￿ TFF ￿ ING ￿ GN ￿ ING (65)
The ￿scal authority￿ s is faced by a budget constraint which says that public debt Bt is the cumu-
lative sum of past public de￿cits (D) i.e.
Bt = Bt￿1 + Dt (66)
The ￿scal policy rule is based on a reaction of personal income taxes to the deviation of the
government￿ s debt to GDP ratio from its predetermined target and which contributes to adjustment
towards the stock-￿ ow equilibrium in the long-run.
￿￿t = ’1(bt￿1 ￿ b) + ’2￿bt￿1 (67)
where ￿t is the personal income tax rate (TF=Y ), and bt is the government debt to GDP ratio
(B/Y), and b is the target. The parameters ’1and ’2 are set at 0.003 and 0.03 respectively.
The monetary policy rule follows a simple Taylor rule speci￿cation in which the short term interest
rate it;is determined by the in￿ ation gap, where this target level of in￿ ation (￿^ ￿ pt) is set to 2 per cent
per annum and the output gap (yt ￿ ￿ yt) along with the lagged interest e⁄ect where "t is a serially
uncorrelated shock to the interest rate:
it = (1 ￿ 0:25) ￿ it￿1 + 0:25 ￿ (4 ￿ 1:5 ￿ (￿pt+1 ￿ ￿^ ￿ pt) + 0:5 ￿ (yt ￿ ￿ yt)) + "t (68)
A.7.1 Financial Markets
The speci￿cation of the long-term interest rate equation is:
lt = 0:7 ￿ lt￿1 + 0:3 ￿ it (69)
The exchange rate follows a standard real UIP equation.
et = et+1 + (r
f
t ￿ rt)=400 (70)
where e is the (log of) the real exchange rate and r
f
t .is the foreign real interest rate.ECB
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Real variables, employment and exchange rate are presented as percentage deviations from baseline, all other
variables are in difference from baseline (either percentage points or percent of GDP). Inﬂation is computed
as year-on-year rate of change.ECB
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Real variables, employment and exchange rate are presented as percentage deviations from baseline, all other
variables are in difference from baseline (either percentage points or percent of GDP). Inﬂation is computed
as year-on-year rate of change.ECB




























































































































































































































































































































Real variables, employment and exchange rate are presented as percentage deviations from baseline,
all other variables are in difference from baseline (either percentage points or percent of GDP).
Inﬂation is computed as year-on-year rate of change.ECB































































































































































































































































































































Real variables, employment and exchange rate are presented as percentage deviations from baseline,
all other variables are in difference from baseline (either percentage points or percent of GDP).
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Real variables, employment and exchange rate are presented as percentage deviations from baseline,
all other variables are in difference from baseline (either percentage points or percent of GDP).
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Real variables, employment and exchange rate are presented as percentage deviations from baseline,
all other variables are in difference from baseline (either percentage points or percent of GDP).
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Real variables, employment and exchange rate are presented as percentage deviations from baseline,
all other variables are in difference from baseline (either percentage points or percent of GDP).
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Real variables, employment and exchange rate are presented as percentage deviations from baseline,
all other variables are in difference from baseline (either percentage points or percent of GDP).
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Figure 9: Announced, unannounced and learning 























Real variables, employment and exchange rate are presented as percentage deviations from baseline,
all other variables are in difference from baseline (either percentage points or percent of GDP).
Inﬂation is computed as year-on-year rate of change.ECB
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Figure 10: Shock to Interest rates (50 basis points):
Exogenous exchange rates; Impact on Real Output
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Figure 11: Shock to Interest rates (50 basis points):
Exogenous exchange rates; Impact on HICP Inflation
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Figure 12: Permanent shock to government expenditure (0.5 % GDP):
Exogenous interest rates; Impact on Real Output
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Figure 13: Permanent shock to government expenditure (0.5 % GDP):
Exogenous interest rates; Impact on HICP Inflation
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